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Summary
This study produces an estimate of the global costs of public expenditure on criminal justice. The global
estimate is an extrapolation from data provided by the governments of seventy countries. At the country-level
there is a strong relationship between the level of available public money and expenditure upon public policing,
courts, prosecution and prisons. The relationship is explored using six regression models, and criminal justice
expenditure in other countries is estimated using the best models. Global criminal justice expenditure in 1997
is estimated at $360 billion (the equivalent of $424 billion in 2004 prices), of which 62 percent was spent on
policing, 3 percent on prosecutions, 18 percent on courts, and 17 percent on prisons. As the first systematic
empirical estimate of global criminal justice expenditure, it is hoped that the present research may spur better
data collection practices and further research.
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Knowledge relating to the overall well-being of the
planet, and cross-national variation within it, is
increasingly used to inform national and
international policy. Some global indicators are
counts, their attraction being that they were
previously unknown: In 1999, the earth’s human
population exceeded six billion for the first time - a
psychological watershed if quantity measures
humanity’s success. Countries are frequently ranked
on key socio-economic indicators such as literacy,
mortality and gross domestic product. Composite
indicators such as the Human Development Index
(see e.g. United Nations Development Programme
2002) and the Corruption Perceptions Index
(Transparency International 2002) are derived. Such
indicators serve as benchmarks against which to
measure variations in time and place. Their political
importance is such that they can provoke
investigation of good and bad practice in countries
that are statistically deviant. Yet, while the global
village requires global indicators, they are relatively
few and far between, and still often at a fledgling
stage of development. Further, while there is a
growing body of research highlighting the
importance of estimating the costs of crime (see
Cohen 2000 for a review), there is little, if any, on
aspects of the global cost of criminal justice. It is in
this context that the present study produces what
we believe to be the first systematic empirical
estimate of the direct cost of public expenditure on
the global criminal justice system.
Previous research has identified a strong
relationship between a country’s economic welfare,
measured as GDP, and its expenditure on criminal
justice (Newman and Howard 1999). This study
continues work begun in Farrell et al. (2001) which
examined only expenditure on policing. Not
surprisingly, on average, richer countries spend more
per capita on criminal justice than poor countries.
In this study, the relationship between GDP and
spending on criminal justice is examined using data
for seventy countries. To examine the extent to which
GDP can be used to predict criminal justice
expenditure, six regression models are developed.
The ‘best’ model of the relationship is identified for
each of policing, prosecution, courts and prisons.
These models are then used to predict criminal
justice expenditure in other countries, which are
summed to produce a global estimate. It should be
noted at the outset that neither expenditure on
privatised nor informal community aspects of
criminal justice are included in the estimates.
The bulk of this study is concerned with
ensuring transparency of method with regard to data
preparation and statistical technique. A summary of
the key finding is as follows: It is estimated that the
world spent $360 billion on criminal justice in 1997.
Of this total, 62 percent ($222.5 billion) was spent
on public policing1, 3 percent ($11.2 billion) on
prosecutions, 18 percent ($63.5 billion) on courts,
and 17 percent ($62.5 billion) on prisons.
What is the point of estimating global criminal
justice expenditure? Primarily, the estimate is one
component of the costs of crime that has not been
estimated to date. Estimating the costs of crime is
an increasingly important area of criminal justice
research. While such an estimate may prove useful
for future research and analyses, it is also necessary
to be cautious about the potential abuse of such
estimates. Mark Cohen notes some of the benefits
while warning of the potential for abuse of aggregate
cost estimates:
“[W]hat are we to do with this
information? If we are successful in fully
estimating the cost of crime we can
compare this total cost estimate with that
of other social problems (e.g. cancer, auto
crashes, homelessness). Whether one
agrees that this is a useful exercise or not,
various advocacy groups do compare
‘costs of crime’ estimates with the cost of
other social ills in an effort to affect policy
decisions. Unfortunately, misuses of these
data occur on both sides of the political
debate.” (Cohen, 2000; 269)
While it is possible that any research findings
can be wilfully abused, this should not become a
reason to hinder the accumulation of knowledge.
However, the possibility does highlight the need for
methodological transparency, and this is one of the
key facets of the present study. In addition, the
findings of this study are presented with a range of
cautions and caveats.
Introduction
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To our knowledge there is only one previous
research study with a primary focus upon the
expenditure data from the UN Crime Survey. Jon
Spencer (1993) examined trends over time in
expenditure between 1982 and 1986. He found
expenditure had increased generally and that
changing levels of expenditure tended to be
correlated between stages of the criminal justice
system. If spending on one stage increased then,
generally speaking, it increased for the other stages.
Spencer concluded that “This analysis suggests that
governments allocate resources to criminal justice
with little or no attention to outcomes” (p.1).
Spencer’s analysis was of trends and did not include
any estimates of spending for countries where the
data was not available.
The remainder of this study is structured as
follows. The next section describes data sources and
data preparation. The regression model analysis and
findings are then presented. The discussion section
suggests uses of the present research, makes
suggestions for future research, and is followed by
the conclusion.
2. Data Sources and Preparation
2.1 The UN Crime Survey
This section discusses survey methodology and data
quality control. The primary data source was reports
by national governments to the sixth United Nations
Survey of Crime Trends and Criminal Justice
Systems (hereafter the UN Crime Survey), for which
the most recent data relates to 1997. The release of
the survey used here was that of 27 June 2001.
Survey responses had been received from eighty-
three countries of which seventy provided full or
partial information on criminal justice expenditures.
Methodological issues have been extensively
explored in the literature relating to the UN Crime
Survey. Cross-national differences reflect differences
in the composition of criminal justice systems,
variation in definitions and terms, as well as
differences in the extent, capacity, logistical
difficulty inherent to, and emphasis upon, national-
level data reporting and recording practices.
Countries differ in purchasing power, so they can
buy different amounts for the same dollar price.
Differences in legal definitions may mean that, for
example, country A might include military police
as part of policing whereas country B does not. Such
definitional differences may or may not be
identifiable depending on whether they are reflected
in the terminology of the report from a government.
There are also differences in practice: Country A
may prosecute all offences whereas country B does
not. Procedural differences may produce spending
differences if, for example, country A defined
prosecution as only those cases that reach court,
whereas country B included warnings issued by the
prosecutor among its prosecutions. Counting rules
and statistical classification are a source of variation
as some countries may include minor local
expenditures in national estimates whereas others
do not. Certain factors remain unknown relating to
informal and other justice procedures, such as
whether the costs of Sharia courts are included where
they exist.2 Similarly, where there is a division
between central and local government, it is not
always clear whether local activities are included
in national budgets. There is also the possibility of
error during the various stages of reporting and
recording the data: A country cannot accurately
report expenditure levels if the data does not exist,
if national data collection is not coordinated, if data
are out of date, if the survey went to the wrong
government department or respondent, or if clerical
errors were made in the completion of the survey
form. Finally, the data is fragmentary in part because
some countries simply do not respond to the survey
while others return it incomplete without
explanation. It has been suggested that response rates
and completion rates could reflect secrecy relating
to issues of national security issues, or various
aspects of international politics, and all of these
issues have been extensively reviewed elsewhere
(Nalla and Newman (1994), Newman and Howard
(1999a, 199b), Neapolitan (1996), Kangaspunta et
al. (1998a, 1998b), Marshall (1998), Spencer (1993),
Pease and Hukkila (1990; Tseloni and Pease (1994),
Joutsen (1998); Aromaa and Joutsen (2003).
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The quality control measures incorporated in
the UN Crime Survey data collection process are,
like most research, far from perfect, but include a
number of aspects. First, and perhaps key among
these is the clear definitions of terms on the survey
questionnaire sent to governments, plus a separate
set of instructions for each component part (police,
courts, prosecutions, prisons). The following are the
instructions given on the survey for respondents
completing the section on policing expenditures (but
the wording is essentially the same for the other
parts, substituting the relevant term for police):
“Total police budget/financial resources
should include all monies allocated to the
civil police function at the national level,
including salaries and fixed assets. When
calculating salaries, please include total
monies spent on every individual
employed in the given area. When
calculating fixed assets, please include all
monies invested in non-personnel assets,
such as buildings, automobiles and office
equipment.” (Centre for International
Crime Prevention, 1999; 8)
A second aspect of quality control is the effort
made to track each individual person who is
responsible for completing the survey in a particular
country. This reduces anonymity, generates
accountability, and improves communication
between respondents and the survey team.
Respondents working for individual governments
can contact the UN data coordinators with questions,
and UN data coordinators can contact respondents
to verify data where necessary. A third key control
discussed by Newman and Howard (1999a; 8), is
how political pressures relating to the release of
national-level data promote accountability:
Governments generally do not release data into the
international arena without having first closely
scrutinized it. Some countries may, of course, overtly
abuse or misrepresent their statistics for political
gain, but with increasing democracy in Eastern
Europe and the ex-Soviet block this type of abuse
has undoubtedly declined in recent years. Other
aspects of quality control for the UN crime survey
have improved over the quarter century that the
survey has been conducted (see Burnham 1999 for
an overview of the survey’s origins and history). A
fourth quality control strategy is the maintenance of
institutional memory through the continued
involvement of key researchers. Even as new
administrators or clerical staff are introduced into
the process, this institutional memory reduces the
likelihood of basic errors in data collection and
processing. Fifth, the survey format has been revised
to incorporate new and innovative approaches as part
of a learning process.3 Sixth, the small ‘core’ group
working on the survey at the UN are informed by an
informal ‘friends of the survey’ international network
of survey researchers. Seventh, the survey process
and speed of communication (facilitating the
checking of data) has been helped by the Internet
during the last decade. Eighth, the increasing amount
of published academic research based on the survey,
and its resultant gradual permeation of media and
academic debates on cross-national issues, and its
public availability on the Internet (via
www.unodc.org) means that its utility is increasingly
recognized - another form of institutional memory.
It should also be borne in mind that, relative to many
national-level surveys such as the US National
Crime Victimization Survey or the British Crime
Survey which are sponsored by national
governments, the UN Crime Survey runs on a
remarkably small budget. To our knowledge, the
survey is typically undertaken largely by one
professional researcher who later employs the skills
of a data entry clerk. While other researchers are
consulted as discussed above, no independent survey
companies, data collectors or researchers are
contracted. By most western research standards, the
survey team are shockingly under-resourced. Subject
to such constraints, the survey is arguably quite
remarkable, while most of its critics derive from a
better-resourced tradition.4 This is not intended to
suggest that the survey is perfect or might not benefit
from improved data collection practice and further
reliability and validity checks: Indeed, as discussed
later, it is hoped that the present study might be used
to stimulate better reporting of data by countries.
However, it remains the case that, when approached
with the necessary caution, the survey is the most
comprehensive existing resource for many areas of
cross-national research using criminal justice data.
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The general quality control issues discussed
above were supplemented with a further set
undertaken specifically for the present study. The
sixth survey requested information for 1995 to 1997
inclusive. Generally, those countries that reported
data did so for each year. Data for 1997 was cross-
checked for consistency with that for previous years.
In a small number of cases where 1997 data was
absent it was substituted with data for 1996 where
available. Preliminary descriptive data analysis was
undertaken to eyeball the expenditure data for
obvious errors. Errors in reporting and recording as
well as at the data entry stage were the most likely
explanation for the small number of extreme values
that were found. For example, an examination of
expenditure upon Canadian prisons revealed that the
source data set contained a value in Canadian dollars
that was in error by two decimal places. This datum
was corrected. However, to ensure a conservative
approach, a small number of data items were
excluded where their true value could not be verified
even by cross-checking. Most of these were not from
highly developed countries, so it is arguably more
likely that such discrepancies reflect variation in the
quality of data reporting and recording systems. A
possible error source could be discrepancies
introduced via exchange rates during the conversion
of currencies into US dollars, particularly if local
currencies were extremely volatile. The country-
level specifics of the study’s quality control process
are detailed in a technical appendix.
Despite the various quality controls, the present
analysis should be viewed with caution. Even though
they are the best available, the data are imperfect.
Indeed, if the data were perfect there would be no
need for estimation of missing values: global
criminal justice expenditure could be found by
simply summing the values reported by individual
countries. However, we proceed from the reasonable
position that the data cup is half full rather than half
empty.
2.2 Sampling and Representativeness
of Countries
Richer countries can afford to spend more upon data
collection efforts. They are consequently over-
represented in this data set as in most cross-national
analyses. The sample of countries is therefore not
representative of the world. However, the key issue
for present purposes is not whether the sample of
countries is representative. The key issue is whether
the relationship between GDP and criminal justice
expenditure that derives from the data is
representative. Since, as will become evident, the
greatest divergence in this relationship occurs among
richer countries, it is a positive attribute of the dataset
to have an over-representation of richer countries
(those toward the right-hand side of Figures 1 to 4).
The majority of missing data points relate to poorer
countries which, in absolute dollar terms, contribute
far less to global expenditure totals.
A second aspect of the study overtly seeks to
address the possibility that the relationship between
GDP and criminal justice expenditure is different
for different sets of countries. Specifically, the
statistical models that is split or kinked (Model 4) is
included to capture the fact that there may be a
different GDP-spending relationship among poorer
countries than richer countries. In short, once again
we conclude that the present data set is imperfect
but that there is good reason to believe this is not an
overwhelming obstacle.
2.3 Other data sources
The database of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) was used to complete the list of world
countries and populations, and was the source of
the bulk of information on international exchange
rates. 5 The specifics of this procedure are detailed
in the technical appendix. Using the 1997 exchange
rates, expenditure data for all countries was
converted to 1997 US dollar equivalents. All analysis
described below uses US dollars.
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3. Analysis
As an analytical quality control, statistical outliers
were excluded from the main analysis. They were
identified as national expenditures where the
standardized residual resulting from the regression
of per capita GDP upon per capita expenditure (for
each stage) was greater than the 5 percent value from
a two-tailed Student’s distribution.6 Eight data points
were excluded, three of which related to Northern
Ireland for each stage of its criminal justice system
except prosecutions. Bahrain and Malaysia were
outliers for police and prison expenditures
respectively. Scotland, Colombia and Panama were
outliers for prosecutions. All of the outliers were
far higher per capita expenditures, relative to the
per capita GDP, than the remaining countries.
1) Six regression models of the relationship
between GDP and criminal justice expenditure were
developed. The aim of the modelling was to identify
the model which yielded the most accurate
predictions for each of police, prosecution, court and
prison expenditure. Each model represents a
modification to the basic relationship between per
capita expenditure and per capita GDP. That model
was selected, for each stage of the criminal justice
system, which best satisfied the criteria of goodness
of fit and statistical efficiency as detailed below. For
each stage, that model was then used to predict
expenditure for countries for which the data were
unavailable.
2) The first model is the simple linear per capita
model. It reflects the possibility that richer countries
spend more on criminal justice. The precise form of
the relationship may, however, be more complex
than the simple linear per capita model. It may differ
across stages of the criminal justice system, across
time, across country type and so on. The subsequent
models investigate whether the estimates of global
criminal justice expenditure are sensitive to various
changes in the functional form of the regression
model.
3) Figures 1 to 4 show plots of the data points
for per capita GDP and per capita criminal justice
expenditure, with a linear best fit line (Model 1)
superimposed. The chart for policing includes the
quadratic fitted curve (Model 2) for illustrative
purposes. Countries are labelled to the extent
possible on the charts. The clusters of countries at
the bottom left of each chart are not labelled if it
was not feasible. On the charts, readers should note
the variation in the vertical axes, which reflect
greater per capita spending on policing, followed
by prisons, courts, and prosecutions. Countries that
were statistical outliers as described above, are not
shown in the charts. Expenditures for countries with
missing values were estimated using the regression
equation, and global expenditure estimated as the
sum of national values. In the global total, the
reported values were used for countries that had
previously been excluded as outliers in the model’s
development. The 95 percent confidence intervals
were calculated according to the following formula
for the variance of the prediction of total expenditure,
based on the method described by Judge et al. (1988:
251):
 var = ′ ′ ′ +−σ 2w [X (X X) X I ]w0
1
0 m (1)
where σ2  is the regression mean square error,
w is an m x 1 vector of population values for the m
countries we are predicting, X0 is an m x 2 matrix of
explanatory variables for the countries we are
predicting, X is an n x 2 matrix of explanatory
variables for the countries in the regression sample,
and Im is an m-dimensional identity matrix.
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Figure 1: Policing Expenditure and GDP
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Figure 2: Prosecution Expenditure and GDP
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Figure 4: Prison Expenditure and GDP
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
GDP per capita (US$)
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
 (U
S$
)
Switzerland
Japan
Denmark
United States
Singapore
Iceland
Sweden
Hong Kong
Germany
England and Wales
Netherlands
Finland
Australia
Ireland
Canada
Italy
Scotland
New Zealand
Israel
Andorra
Spain
Greece
Cyprus
Portugal
Argentina
Czech Rep.
S. Africa
Hungary
Figure 3: Court Expenditure and GDP
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To illustrate the potential importance of
modifications to the per capita model, consider again
policing expenditure shown in Figure 1. Visual
inspection of the scatter plot and fitted line suggest
that there is some systematic pattern to the extent to
which actual police expenditure per capita diverges
from the fitted value (the value represented by the
regression line)7. In particular, at low levels of per
capita GDP (below $10,000), the linear model
overpredicts per capita police expenditure for
virtually all countries, while at higher levels of per
capita GDP, the opposite is the case with most
countries having lower fitted than actual values. It
seems that, in the data, the slope of the relationship
between per capita police expenditure and per capita
GDP is higher at lower levels of per capita GDP and
vice versa. Alternatively put, the marginal propensity
to spend on policing is lower at higher levels of
income. Such a relationship may fit with an
explanation of criminal justice expenditure as a
necessity whereby poorer countries spend
disproportionately more on criminal justice than
richer countries. This suggestion leads to the second
statistical model of per capita police expenditure:
 (X/P)i = α + β(G/P)i + γ(G/P)i2 + εi             (2)
i = 1, …, n.
where X - police expenditure
P - population
G - GDP
ε  - a random error term
i - country index
n - number of countries which report
police expenditure (excluding outliers).
Through the quadratic term, Model 2 allows
for a declining regression slope at higher levels of
per capita GDP. The fitted regression line from this
model shown in Figure 1 yields a noticeable
improvement in fit upon the linear per capita model.
There is a modest improvement in the model R2 (the
proportion of the variation in police expenditure
explained by the model) from 0.54 to 0.59. In
addition the coefficient on the quadratic term is
statistically significant (two-tailed p-value = 0.030).
Clearly, introducing a quadratic term to the
model is only one way whereby the per capita model
could be modified. Other forms of non-linear
relationship are possible, as are other
transformations of the dependent and independent
variables in the regression. Different stages of the
criminal justice system might be best represented
by quite different specifications. To investigate this
issue fully, a series of regression models was
estimated for each stage of the criminal justice
system to find the one which fitted best. Three
criteria were used to choose and refine the regression
models. First, since the over-arching goal of the
present study is to provide estimates of total world
criminal justice expenditure, the class of regression
model was selected using the criterion that it had
the best in-sample forecasting performance. Second,
in the interests of statistical efficiency, standard
techniques of statistical inference were used to refine
the resulting model. Third, we were at pains to
ensure that the resulting predicted values passed
what Hamermesh (1999) calls the “sniff test”, that
is, that they appeared to make economic sense.
TABLE 1: Results of Linear Per Capita Model
CJ Stage N
countries
#
outliers
excluded
R2 Coeff. Constant Estimated
Global
Expenditure
US$ Billion
Lower
95% CI
Upper
95% CI
Police 47 2 0.5405 0.0052 24.003 $286.560 80.220 492.901
Prosecution 35 3 0.6343 0.0003 0.3967 $12.055 4.447 19.663
Courts 34 1 0.483 0.0013 1.4604 $59.152 -10.073 128.376
Prisons 54 2 0.6181 0.0015 0.5946 $58.693 24.656 92.730
Total $416.460 198.088 634.834
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Table 2 describes the various models that were
evaluated and summarizes their in-sample
forecasting performance. Models 1 and 2 were
discussed above – the linear per capita model and
quadratic per capita model, respectively. Models 3
and 4 are variants of the per capita model which
attempt to capture differences in the slope of the
relationship between per capita expenditure and
GDP at different levels of per capita income. Model
3 is a double log model that allows for non-linearity
through the specification of the dependent and
independent variables in natural logarithmic (the ln
function) form. This is a commonly used model in
applied statistical research. Model 4 is effectively a
piecewise linear model which estimates separate
linear regression lines for ‘poor’ countries (defined
as those with less than $10,000 per capita GDP) and
‘rich’ countries. Thus Model 4 also overcomes the
issue of the over-representation of rich countries in
the sample, a point discussed earlier. Close
examination of Figures 1 to 4 suggests that the clump
of countries at the bottom left (low per capita GDP,
low criminal justice expenditure, many of which are
not labelled due to lack of space in the charts) could
be qualitatively different from other countries. By
allowing for the possibility of a kinked expenditure
curve, this model ensures the integrity of findings
for ‘poorer’ countries if their relationship between
GDP and criminal justice expenditure is somewhat
different than that for ‘richer’ countries.
Models 5 and 6 are based around the notion
that, since the aim is to predict total expenditure in
each country, the appropriate dependent variable is
the level of total criminal justice expenditure rather
than per capita expenditure. Uncoupling population
from the financial variables allows population itself
to enter as a separate independent variable. Hence
Models 5 and 6 are multiple regression models.
Model 6 is a double log version of the relationship
to account for potential non-linearities.
Table 2 reports the root mean square forecast
error for each of the six models examined. This is
defined as
(3)
RMSFE =
where Xi is expenditure on the relevant stage of
the criminal justice system by country i and 
iXˆ
is the predicted or forecast level from the
regression model under consideration for the same
country. Note that iXˆ is a transformation of the
regression fitted value for models1-4 and 6; the
per capita models require the multiplication of
the fitted values by population while the double
log models require the antilog transformation to
be taken.8
TABLE 2: The Model Selection Process
Root Mean Square Forecasting ErrorModel
No.
Name Equation
Police Pros. Court Prisons
1 Linear Per
Capita
(X/P)i = α1 + β1(G/P)i + εi 3695.03 205.84 1975.33 1759.40
2 Quadratic Per
Capita
(X/P)i = α2 + β2(G/P)i + γ2(G/P)i2 + εi 3490.07 322.66 1930.18 1767.41
3 Double Log
Per Capita
ln(X/P)i = α3 + β3ln(G/P)i + εi 3740.37 187.70 2042.51 2098.39
4 Fully
Interacted -
Per Capita
(X/P)i = α4 + β4(G/P)i + γ4Di +
δ4Di(G/P)i + εi
3614.74 248.33 1964.19 1773.85
5 Multiple
Regression
Xi = α5 + β5Gi + γ5Pi + εi 3659.00 148.39 1334.63 1425.55
6 Double Log
Multiple
Regression
ln(Xi) = α6 + β6ln(Gi) + γ6ln(Pi) + εi 4638.97 239.11 2035.86 2466.01
( )
n
XXn
i ii
2
1
ˆ
=
−
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Perusal of the columns of root mean squared
forecast errors for each of the stages shows that,
broadly speaking, the linear per capita and multiple
regression models perform better than the double
log models. For policing, RMSFE was minimized
by the quadratic per capita model (Model 2)
discussed above. This model also seemed to give
reasonable predictions of the missing values. For
the other three elements of criminal justice
expenditure the linear multiple regression model had
the best in-sample performance. However, this
model had the unfortunate property of producing
negative predictions of expenditure for a significant
number of countries. One approach to solving this
problem would be simply to set the predicted values
to zero for such countries. As well as being ad hoc
this is clearly unrealistic and so a different route
was identified: since investigation suggested that
statistically insignificant explanatory variables were
the cause of the negative estimates, such variables
were excluded from the regression models. Thus
Model 5 was re-estimated for each of prosecution,
court and prison expenditure with the restriction a5
= g5 = 0 imposed. This restriction was supported by
the data in each case (the p-values were 0.3171 for
prosecutions, 0.4575 for courts and 0.4134 for
prisons).9
With a ‘best’ model in hand for each of the
stages of the criminal justice system it was a simple
matter to compute estimates of global expenditure
for each category and to find the associated
confidence interval. The results are displayed in
Table 3. The 95 percent confidence intervals for
police expenditure were computed as in equation 1
while for the other stages of the criminal justice
system, the vector w was replaced by an m-
dimensional unit vector. This is because, unlike
models based on per capita expenditure, there was
no need to weight the predicted values by the level
of population.
4. Discussion
The use of several statistical models was more than
just a changing room exercise of trying on various
hats to see which fits best. Although it took place
largely as an iterative and empirically-driven
process, the models derive some theoretical
justification from the literature on public budgeting.
Lynch’s classic text concludes that
“It is money. The one common subject in
any budget discussion is money. Other
subjects are important, but they are
mentioned in relationship to money or are
translated into money. Budgeting involves
dollars and cents often expressed in the
millions of dollars.” (Lynch 1979; 2,
emphasis added)
TABLE 3: Results of Refined Estimation Procedure
CJ Stage Estimated
Global Expenditure
US$ Billion
Percent of Total Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI
Police $222.530 61.87 16.990 428.070
Prosecution $11.163 3.10 6.950 15.376
Courts $63.472 17.65 26.216 100.727
Prisons $62.528 17.35 26.171 98.886
Total $359.693 100.00 149.550 569.836
         Note to Table 3: Total in percentage column does not equal 100 due to rounding.
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In practice, society’s ideal of a welfare-
maximization goal is transgressed by private
interests from sources including pressure groups,
bureaucrats and voter preferences as well as the
influence of previous budget levels that produce path
dependence (Steiner, 1971; Rubin, 1997; Peacock,
1978; Tullock, 1989). More specifically in relation
to national spending on criminal justice, the major
conclusion of the only other previous systematic
cross-national study was that “governments allocate
resources to criminal justice with little, or no,
attention to outcomes.” (Spencer 1993; 7). Even a
critic of our parsimonious approach to variable
selection cannot overlook its possibilities as a
foundation upon which future research might build.
Such future research would be testing additional
hypotheses of the predictability of national-level
criminal justice expenditure. We anticipate however,
that such research may well experience negative or
rapidly diminishing returns to the investment.
The introduction to this study began to address
the utility of the present type of cost estimation
exercise. It was suggested that global-level cost
estimates may, in time, become increasingly useful
- just as at one time it may not have been intuitively
apparent that regional, national, city, or village-level
estimates were of any utility. It was also suggested
that the potential for wilful abuse of the estimates is
insufficient reason to stop the pursuit of knowledge.
However, some aspects of the potential utility of
the present study will benefit from further
elucidation. The present exercise is intended as a
preliminary step towards better estimates in the hope
that future research and data collection efforts can
improve upon them. However, it may still be
possible to develop some tentative comparisons to
other global expenditures: If 1997 criminal justice
expenditures were inflated to 2004 prices, global
expenditure on criminal justice would be estimated
as $424 billion.10 This is around half the estimated
$812 billion global expenditure on armaments, five
times the estimated $80 billion spent on education,
and roughly double the turnover of the global
tobacco industry.11 Other policy-relevant research
questions could include: What are the main between-
country and within-country variations in criminal
justice expenditures? How do they vary across stages
of the criminal justice system? What is the income
elasticity of demand for criminal justice? Why do
some countries spend proportionally more on some
parts of the criminal justice system than others? Are
there particular ‘types’ of countries that spend more
on some stages of the criminal justice system than
other? If prosecution and courts represent the stages
of ‘justice’, are there some countries that pay a
relatively greater attention to justice than others?
How do these and other variables change over time?
How do the income elasticities of demand for
criminal justice compare to those for other public
and non-public goods? This is not intended as an
exhaustive list but, rather, is suggestive of the
potentially broad and policy-relevant research
agenda that could emerge.
As the first systematic empirical estimates of
global spending, the current estimates may have the
potential to instigate an improvement of
international data collection. Improvements in data
quality rather than refinements in statistical
regression method are the preferable long-term
source of improved confidence in global criminal
justice expenditure estimates. The relevant United
Nations bodies should consider using the present
estimates to encourage countries to improve their
data collection and reporting practices (a listing of
actual and predicted expenditures by country and
stage of the criminal justice system is available from
the corresponding author upon request but, at the
suggestion of several commentators, was excluded
here for brevity). This is not meant to
condescendingly suggest that poor countries will
improve data collection when faced with the threat
of estimates produced by foreigners, but it may
stimulate greater effort in data collection and
reporting (particularly a reduction in unnecessary
non-responses and partial responses) in some
marginal cases. In addition, the use of predictive
techniques for the imputation of missing values, such
as those used here, may have broader implications
for the use of cross-national data other than that on
criminal justice expenditure.
22HEUNI Paper No. 20
5. Conclusion
The study found that criminal justice expenditure
levels are significantly tied to levels of available
public monies as determined by the strength of a
national economy. Despite acknowledged
limitations of data and method, the study produced
the first systematic empirical estimate of global
expenditure on criminal justice. The confidence
intervals are soberingly wide, the estimates should
be interpreted with caution, and the study viewed
as an incremental step towards improved data
collection and estimation method. It is hoped that
the present study provokes better data collection and
encourages the investigation of methods for the
estimation for missing data in this field.
Money makes the world go round, or so they
say. However, while money does not necessarily take
responsibility for the sun’s gravitational pull upon
the earth, it does facilitate the allocation of scarce
resources in human society. Whether or not it proves
to be a robust theory of global expenditure upon
criminal justice remains to be tested by future
research.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
The first section of this appendix contains
information relating to the UN Crime Survey data.
The short second section relates to supplementary
data sets.
The UN Crime Survey Data
The Bulgarian government reported expenditure
data on courts, prosecution and prisons but not on
policing, noting that “The data on the numerical
strength of the police personnel and financial
resources of the police in Bulgaria are a state secret.”
Partial data on national policing expenditure was
provided by the Estonian government with the rider
that “[The] Security police board is excluded as their
personnel figures are not public.” The Czech
Republic reported that “The budget of the Czech
Republic police covers total for current and capital
data, including the Czech Republic Investigation
Office. Data for the Czech Republic Investigation
Offices within these years were not separately
surveyed and investigated and that is why we cannot
present them separately.”
The response from the Israeli government noted that
the police budget “[i]ncludes the budget of police
prosecutors” while with respect to prosecution,
“[t]he budget figures are for governmental
prosecutors within the Ministry of Justice. ” The
report of the Romanian government noted in relation
to prosecutions that “The budget of the Public
Ministry is different from and independent of the
budget of the Ministry of Justice and that of the
Police. The structure of the annual budget comprises
in principle the following sections: expenses for
staff; maintenance (buildings, repairs, vehicles and
other assets, fuel, office equipment, inventory items);
investments (furniture, vehicles).”
In relation to courts in Bulgaria it was observed that
”Included are financial resources for wages and
salaries and for social insurance contributions of the
magistrates and the personnel of the Ministry of
Justice and Legal Eurointegration.” A comment in
relation to Danish courts noted that “Finances of
Danish law courts, capital summary and edp in
registration of title to land, etc. are included in this
category”
The sixth UN Crime Survey was accompanied by a
Crime Guide.12 The Guide contained comments from
responding governments, translated as appropriate.
Based on the comments we made five adjustments
to a specific data item. Each adjustment involved
an assumption or extrapolation aimed at reducing
the amount of error: The Danish government noted
that “police and prosecution data could not be
separated”, and that the same value had been
included for both in the database. This value was
split proportionally between police and prosecutions
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to reflect the proportional spending levels of
countries which reported the data separately. For
other countries, 6.08% of the combined police and
prosecution budget was spent on prosecutions, and
93.92% on policing, and the Danish police and
prosecution budget was split to reflect these
proportions; A similar revision was made in relation
to courts and prosecutions for Germany and
Switzerland. In relation to Germany, the Crime
Guide noted that a “[d]istinction between court and
prosecution budget is not available”, while the
response of the Swiss government noted that the
court budget “includes the prosecution budget”.
Countries that reported both prosecution and court
data separately spent an average of 16.24% of the
combined total on prosecutions and 83.76% on
courts. The German and Swiss budget figures were
split to reflect this average; The Finnish government
noted that “Lay judges in circuit courts were financed
by municipal resources until 1998. The cost, about
30 million marks is not included in [the] state budget
[the figure given].” Consequently, the reported
Finnish court budget of 931 million marks was
adjusted to 961, an increase of 3.22%. The fifth
change to the data was based upon a comment from
the Canadian government that their prison budget
included “[a]dult data only”. Separate budget data
for adult and juvenile prisons was not available for
any country, and so the proportions going to each in
other countries could not be calculated and applied
to Canada. However, data on the number of beds in
adult and juvenile prisons was available elsewhere
in the UN survey, although not for Canada. On
average, the number of juvenile beds was 5.53% of
adult beds. On the assumption that proportional
expenditures may mirror the proportion of beds, the
Canadian prison budget was inflated by 5.53% as a
crude estimate of the additional cost of juvenile
institutions.
Twenty additional data items were excluded from
the analysis. Four exclusions were made in relation
to policing: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Scotland and
Tanzania. The lowest given value for policing
expenditure in any of these countries was six times
greater than expenditure in any other country. Six
exclusions were made in relation to prosecutions:
Bulgaria, Denmark, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia
and Tajikistan, whose values were at least ten times
those for other countries. Three exclusions were
made in relation to court expenditure: Georgia,
Kazakhstan and the Republic of Korea, each of
which had expenditures at least six times greater
than all other countries. Three exclusions were made
in relation to prison expenditure: Kyrgyzstan, Jordan
and Panama, each of which had values that were
several orders of magnitude greater than those of
any other country. An effort was made to trace the
values to determine the origins, but they were in the
UN crime survey database. It is likely that some of
the errors arose during the reporting stages –
government officials who completed the
questionnaire may have misinterpreted an aspect of
the question, or perhaps may not have noticed that
data were to be reported in millions of local currency
units. The UN database is compiled in local currency
units and so such discrepancies would be unlikely
to be noticed if the currencies were unfamiliar.
Hence it is reasonable to expect that expenditure
data reported incorrectly by a responding country
would go unnoticed prior to the release of the dataset.
It is notable that seven of the exclusions were from
the three countries Georgia, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan, suggesting that a general error was made
in relation to those countries. It is possible that one
or more of the criminal justice expenditures that
were excluded as extreme outliers were not errors.
For example, it could be that these three former
Soviet states undertook massive capital expenditures
on their criminal justice systems in 1997 - a point
that would require further investigation. For present
purposes however, such extremes of expenditure
would have been excluded as statistical outliers by
the method detailed in the Analysis section. With
the exceptions of Scotland, Denmark and possibly
Bulgaria, the other six exclusions related to countries
that are not in the upper-echelons of development
rankings and which are therefore arguably less likely
to have high quality reporting and recording systems
for their aggregate-level data relating to expenditures
across the country.
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Supplementary Data Sources
The list of world countries and their populations was
compiled from the UN crime survey and the database
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Where
population data could not be found in these sources
it was supplemented with data from, in order of
preference, the 1998-based National Population
Projections13, the UN Population Division (World
Population Prospects Population Database), and the
CIA World Factbook.14
The primary source of data on national gross
domestic product (GDP) was the database of the
IMF, supplemented with other sources as necessary.
Eight other sources were used, and in a few instances
GDP data for 1996 was used when 1997 data was
not obtained. The other sources of GDP data were
the CIA World Factbook 2001, the Northern Ireland
Financial Times, the UN Human Development
Report 1999, The Scottish Parliament15, UNCTAD16,
Geographic’s Country Profiles17, Yahoo! Finance18,
and Freiburg University19. There was no reason to
believe that these sources contained bias in the
reporting of GDP data, and every reason to believe
that the inclusion of the data produced an
incremental improvement in our database that was
preferable to the exclusion of that data element.
Expenditure data was reported in local currency
units. Exchange rates for 1997 that were not in the
UN crime survey database were obtained from the
database of the International Monetary Fund.
Where there was a difference in specific data items
between the various possible sources, the differences
were typically minor discrepancies of a few
percentage points, almost certainly reflecting
differences in the reporting and recording of
national-level data. In such instances, the UN crime
survey data was used if available. There were only
a handful of cases where a decision had to be made
regarding a non-trivial difference between sources.
In such instances the two data items were compared
and it would usually be apparent that one contained
an obvious error (probably due to reporting,
recording or data entry error at different stages and
in different sources). Where it was not clear which
data item was preferable, additional qualitative
information was sought to allow the identification
of the most appropriate datum. If available, a third
source of data was utilized as an arbiter. The end
result was a database with complete GDP and
population data for 204 countries.20
Notes
1 Private policing and security expenditures are not
included since, while they are substantial, they do
not utilize government funds.
2 We thank Kauko Aromaa for comments on this
section in particular.
3 It is, as with any change, possible to dispute some
of the revisions: Recent streamlining of the survey
has removed overlapping years of data from each
iteration of the survey, leaving the survey open to
suggestions that fewer validity checks can be
undertaken.
4 For discussion on such issues we thank Adam
Bouloukos, formerly of the United Nations Office
of Drugs and Crime.
5 We thank Matthew Fleming, then of the
International Monetary Fund, for assistance in
locating the relevant exchange rates. The online
currency converter available at www.oanda.com/
convert/classic was used to complement the IMF
data in only a handful of instances.
6 An alternative approach to extreme observations
would have been to use a robust regression technique
(see, for example, Berk, 1990)
7 Such a pattern in the residuals might reflect the
influence of omitted explanatory variables, discussed
further below.
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9 The restriction increased the root mean square
forecasting error but never by enough to prevent this
model being ‘best’ in its column. The figures were
154.39 for prosecutions, 1369.87 for courts and 1451.48
for prisons.
10 Inflation adjustment using the inflation calculator of
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://
www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm.
11 These comparative global spending estimates were
taken from sources of varying degrees of integrity,
relevance and comparability, and are included only to
be suggestive of possible future applications of the
findings - the intention is to put criminal justice
expenditure in a broad comparative perspective rather
than to provide definitive estimates for other items.
The source of the estimates is as follows: Global
military spending of $812 billion in 2001 from the
Center for Defense Information at www.cdi.org/issues/
wme , retrieved on 2nd October 2002; Annual global
spending on education from United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF) report, The State of the World’s
Children, 1999 (see http://www.penpress.org/docs/
PEN84.pdf); Annual sales turnover of the tobacco
industry from www.didyouknow.cd/fastfacts/
money.htm., page 1, retrieved 2nd October 2002.
12 Our thanks are due to Sami Nevala for making the
Crime Guide available.
13 Series PP2 no22; retrieved Jan 31, 2002 from
statbase: www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/
14 Available online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/
15 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/
16 www.unctad.org
17 www.geographic.org
18 http://biz.yahoo/
1 9w w w. z m k . u n i - f r e i b u r g . d e / E u r o p e /
yugoslavia.htm
 20 We note that 204 countries is not a definitive
count or one that is necessarily approved by the
United Nations. However, it is hoped that we did
not exclude any major populations that would
significantly influence the key findings of the
study.
8 For the double log models there is an issue concerning
bias correction when forming the prediction of total
expenditure (see Goldberger, 1968). We applied the
bias correction suggested in Granger and Newbold
(1977) however this rarely improved the in-sample
forecasting performance and even when it did, the
improvement was not enough to significantly increase
the ranking of the relevant model. We therefore do not
pursue the issue further.
28HEUNI Paper No. 20
29HEUNI Paper No. 20
Helsinki 2004
